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Disinflations are a major cause of recessions in modern economies-perhaps 
the dominant cause. In the United States, for example, recessions occurred in 
the early 1970s, mid-l970s,  and early 1980s. Each of these downturns coin- 
cided  with  falling inflation  caused by  tight  monetary  policy  (Romer and 
Romer 1989). 
Is there an iron law that disinflation produces large output losses? Or can 
favorable circumstances and  wise  policies reduce  or  even eliminate these 
costs? Economists have suggested a wide range of answers to these questions. 
One traditional view is that disinflation is less expensive if it occurs slowly, so 
that wages and prices have time to adjust to tighter policy. An opposing view 
(Sargent 1983) is that quick disinflation can be inexpensive, because expecta- 
tions adjust sharply. Some economists argue that disinflation is less costly if 
tight monetary policy is accompanied by incomes policies or other efforts to 
coordinate wage and price adjustment. Finally, a number of  authors suggest 
features of the economic environment that affect the output-inflation  trade-off, 
such as the initial level of inflation (Ball, Mankiw, and Romer 1988), the open- 
ness of the economy (Romer 1991), and the nature of labor contracts (Gor- 
don 1982). 
Despite this debate, there has been little systematic empirical work on these 
issues. The speed of  disinflation, the nature of  incomes policies, and so on 
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differ considerably across countries and disinflation episodes, but we  do not 
know whether these differences produce important differences in output be- 
havior.  Many  studies examine individual disinflation  experiences, but  few 
compare sizable numbers of  episodes. Those that do consider multiple epi- 
sodes focus on establishing that the output losses are generally large (e.g., Gor- 
don 1982; Romer and Romer 1989). This paper measures the variation in the 
costs of disinflation across a sample of episodes, and asks whether this varia- 
tion can be explained.’ 
I examine disinflations from 1960 to the present in moderate-inflation coun- 
tries  of  the  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development 
(OECD). The sample contains all episodes in which trend inflation (defined as 
a moving average of actual inflation) falls substantially (usually more than two 
percentage points). Using quarterly data, I identify twenty-eight episodes in 
nine countries; with annual data, I identify sixty-five episodes in  nineteen 
countries. I then develop a simple method for estimating the “sacrifice ratio” 
for each episode: the ratio of the total output loss to the change in trend infla- 
tion. This method is based on a new approach to measuring full-employment 
output during disinflation. Finally, I examine the relation between the sacrifice 
ratio and the variables that influence it in various theories. 
There are two main results. First, the sacrifice ratio is decreasing in the 
speed of disinflation (the ratio of the change in trend inflation to the length of 
the episode). That is, as suggested by  Sargent, gradualism makes disinflation 
more expensive. Second, the ratio is lower in countries with more flexible labor 
contracts. The most important feature of contracts is their duration. 
I also examine the effects of initial inflation, incomes policies, and the open- 
ness of the economy. For these variables, the results range from negative to in- 
conclusive. 
5.1  Constructing Sacrifice Ratios 
This section develops a method for identifying disinflation episodes and cal- 
culating the associated sacrifice ratios. This approach might prove useful for 
future studies of disinflation, as well as for the empirical work below. 
5.1.1  Motivation 
Many authors have  estimated sacrifice ratios, but their techniques are not 
appropriate for the current study. The most common approach is to derive the 
ratio from an estimated Phillips curve-from  the relation between output and 
inflation in a long time-series (Okun 1978; Gordon and King 1982). A limita- 
tion of  this approach is that it constrains the output-inflation trade-off to be 
the same during disinflations as during increases in trend inflation or temp- 
orary  fluctuations in  demand. This restriction is false if  the sacrifice ratio 
1. A recent paper by Schelde-Andersen (1992) also attempts to explain variation in the costs of 
disinflation. As discussed in the conclusion, the findings are broadly similar to mine. 157  What Determines the Sacrifice Ratio? 
is influenced by  factors specific to disinflations, such as incomes policies or 
credibility-induced  shifts in expectations. Most important, the Phillips-curve 
approach constrains the sacrifice ratio to be the same for all disinflations within 
a time series. This paper estimates separate ratios  for each episode to  see 
whether the ratio varies systematically, both within the experience of a country 
and across countries. 
A number of authors compute sacrifice ratios for particular episodes based 
on ad hoc  estimates  of  the change in inflation and output  losses. Mankiw 
(1991), for example, considers the Volcker disinflation. He notes that inflation, 
as measured by the gross domestic product (GDP) deflator, fell by 6.7 percent 
between 1981 and 1985. He assumes that the natural rate of unemployment is 
6 percent, which implies that unemployment exceeded the natural rate by  a 
total of  9.5 points from  1982 through  1985. Multiplying by  an Okun’s  Law 
coefficient of two, Mankiw obtains a total output loss of 19 points. The sacri- 
fice ratio for the Volcker episode is 1916.7 = 2.8. 
My estimates of sacrifice ratios are in the spirit of previous episode-specific 
estimates, but are more systematic. Previous estimates rely on judgment about 
the  dating  of  episodes  and  the natural  levels  of  unemployment  or output. 
Applying such judgment on a case-by-case basis is cumbersome and raises the 
possibility that different episodes are treated inconsistently. I seek an algorithm 
for calculating sacrifice ratios that generally comes close to conventional esti- 
mates but can be applied mechanically to many episodes. 
5.1.2  Selecting Episodes 
The  first step in  my  procedure  is to  identify  disinflations-episodes  in 
which trend inflation falls substantially. Trend inflation is defined as a centered, 
nine-quarter moving average of actual inflation: trend inflation in quarter I is 
the average of inflation from t -  4 through t + 4. This definition captures the 
intuition that trend inflation is a smoothed version of actual inflation. I doubt 
that other reasonable definitions would produce substantially different results. 
To  identify  disinflations  in  a given  country, I  first identify  “peaks”  and 
“troughs” in  trend inflation. A peak is a quarter in which trend inflation is 
higher than in the previous four quarters and the following four quarters; a 
trough is defined by an analogous comparison to four quarters on each side. A 
disinflation episode is any period that starts at an inflation peak and ends at a 
trough with an annual rate at least two points lower than the peak. These defi- 
nitions assure that an episode is not ended by a brief increase in inflation in 
the midst of  a longer-term decrease. Figure 5.1 illustrates the procedure by 
identifying disinflations in the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, 
and Japan. 
This procedure is meant to separate significant policy-induced shifts in in- 
flation from smaller fluctuations arising from shocks. It appears quite success- 
ful. I have checked the historical record for each of the twenty-eight disinfla- 
tions in my quarterly data set (mainly by reading the OECD Economic Outlook 
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tightening of monetary policy near the start of disinflation. In most cases, the 
motivation for tight policy is either to reduce inflation or to support the domes- 
tic  currency.  Declines  in  inflation  arising  primarily  from  favorable  supply 
shocks, such as the 1986 decline in oil prices, are too small or too transitory to 
meet my criteria for disinflation.  Intentional demand contractions are essen- 
tially the only source of two-point declines in trend inflation. 
Indeed, a significant tightening of monetary policy is not only necessary for 
disinflation but also, it appears, close to sufficient. For the United States and 
Japan, I have compared my disinflations to the lists of monetary contractions 
developed by Romer and Romer (1989) and Fernandez (1992). In the United 
States, policy was tightened in 1968, 1974, 1978, and 1979; if the last two are 
treated as one episode, there is a close correspondence to the disinflations start- 
ing  in  1969,  1974, and  1980.  Similarly,  there  is  a  close  correspondence 
between the six Japanese disinflations and Fernandez’s dates. 
5.1.3  The Sacrifice Ratio 
The denominator of the sacrifice ratio is the change in trend inflation over 
an episode-the  difference between  inflation at the peak and at the trough. 
The numerator is the sum of output losses-the  deviations between actual out- 
put and its “full employment” or trend  level. The most delicate issue is the 
measurement of trend output, because small differences in fitted trends can 
make large differences for deviations. 
Standard approaches to measuring trend output do not yield appealing re- 
sults in this application. This point is illustrated by  figure 5.2, which  shows 
trend output in the United States and Germany calculated using a log-linear 
trend split in 1973 and using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Since these methods 
minimize deviations from trend, they appear to understate or even eliminate 
recessions. In the United States, for example, output does not fall below trend 
during the 1980 recession. In Germany, total deviations from trend during the 
1980-86  disinflation  are close to zero, whereas traditional  accounts of  this 
period include a deep recession without an offsetting boom.2 
My goal is a definition of trend output that is consistent with conventional 
views about the costs of  various disinflations.  After experimentation, I arrive 
at a definition based on three assumptions. First, output is at its trend or natural 
level at the start of a disinflation episode-at  the inflation peak. This assump- 
tion is reasonable because the change in inflation is zero at a peak. The natural 
level of output is often defined as the level consistent with stable inflation. 
Second, I assume that output is again at its trend level four quarters after the 
end of  an episode, that is, four quarters after an inflation trough. The logic 
behind the first assumption suggests that output returns to trend at the trough, 
2. Indeed, the HP filter almost always keeps average output over five years or so close to trend. 
In the United States, average output is close to trend over 1973-78  and  1978-84,  which again 
conflicts with the usual view that these were recessionary periods. 161  What Determines the Sacrifice Ratio? 
where inflation is again stable. In practice, however, the effects of disinflation 
are persistent: output appears to return to trend with a lag. Four quarters is a 
conservative estimate of this lag in a typical disinflation. The return to trend is 
indicated by above-average growth rates in years after troughs. In the United 
States, for example,  average  growth  in  the  four quarters  after an  inflation 
trough is 5.7 percent3 
My final assumption is that trend output grows log-linearly between the two 
points when actual and trend output are equal. In graphic terms, trend output 
is determined by  connecting the two points on the log output series. The nu- 
merator of the sacrifice ratio is the sum of deviations between this fitted line 
and log output. 
Figure 5.3 plots log output and the fitted trends for the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan. The trends are usually close to the lines 
one would draw by hand if doing ad hoc calculations of the sacrifice ratio. 
I  interpret the  sacrifice  ratio  as the  cost of  reducing  inflation  one point 
through  an aggregate demand contraction. This interpretation relies on two 
assumptions. First, shifts in demand are the only source of changes in inflation: 
there are no supply shocks. As discussed above, demand contractions do ap- 
pear to be the main cause of the disinflations in my sample. Nonetheless, it is 
likely that supply as well as demand shifts occur during some episodes, and 
that supply shocks affect the sizes of the output losses and changes in inflation. 
Thus the sacrifice ratio for a given disinflation is a noisy measure of the effects 
of  the demand contraction. This need not create a problem for my  analysis, 
however. When I regress the sacrifice ratio on explanatory variables, the noise 
in the ratio can be interpreted as part of the error term. 
A second assumption behind my sacrifice ratios is that trend output is unaf- 
fected by disinflation: there is no hysteresis. Recent research suggests that de- 
mand  shifts can reduce output permanently  (Romer  1989); that is, contrac- 
tionary policy reduces trend output as well as causing temporary deviations 
from trend. In this case, the true undiscounted sacrifice ratio is infinite. With 
discounting, however, one can calculate a finite ratio with the present value of 
output losses as the numerator. Moreover, it is plausible that this sacrifice ratio 
is well proxied by the ratio computed here. My variable measures the deviation 
from trend output and ignores the change in the trend, but it is likely that these 
components  of the output loss move together:  a larger recession  leads to a 
larger permanent loss. In this case, my procedure understates the sacrifice ratio 
in all disinflations, but accurately identifies the relative costs of different epi- 
3. Both my first and second assumptions can be derived from the following model. Assume y = 
a(a -  a-,)  + by-,,  where y is the deviation of output from trend. This equation is a Lucas supply 
function with lagged inflation proxying for expected inflation. Assume that inflation is stable be- 
fore the inflation peak and after the trough. Finally, assume that b'  is approximately zero. These 
assumptions imply that y = 0 at the inflation peak and four quarters after the trough, and that y < 
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sodes. Thus I can compare episodes without taking a stand on whether disin- 
flation has permanent effeck4 
5.1.4  Annual Data 
For some countries, output data are available only annually. Thus I also use 
a version of my procedure in which a year is the basic time unit. I define trend 
inflation for a year as an eight-quarter moving average centered at the year- 
an average over the four quarters of the year and the two quarters on each side. 
(Quarterly inflation data are available for all countries.) Year t is an inflation 
peak (trough) if trend inflation at t is higher (lower) than trend inflation at t -  1 
or t + 1. That is, peaks and troughs are defined with reference to a year on 
each side rather than four quarters. Trend output is determined by connecting 
output at the inflation peak to output one year after the trough. Finally, a disin- 
flation occurs when trend inflation falls at least 1.5 percentage points, rather 
than two points as before. For a given country, this cutoff yields roughly the 
same number of episodes as I identify with quarterly data. The use of annual 
data dampens movements in inflation, and the resulting loss of episodes offsets 
the gain from the lower cutoff. 
5.2  A Sample of Sacrifice Ratios 
The data on inflation and output are from the International Monetary Fund’s 
Zntemational Financial Statistics.  I examine all OECD countries for which 
reliable data are available and trend inflation has stayed below 20 percent since 
1960. I consider disinflations that begin in  1960 or later and end by  1991. 
Inflation is measured by  the change in the consumer price index (CPI), and 
output is measured by real gross national product (GNP) or real GDP (which- 
ever is available). 
For most countries, my procedure identifies two to five disinflation episodes. 
The quarterly data yield twenty-eight episodes from nine countries: the United 
States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Canada, Ja- 
pan, and Australia. The annual data yield sixty-five episodes in nineteen coun- 
tries. Twenty-five episodes appear in both the quarterly and annual data sets. 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 list all the episodes and their sacrifice ratios. 
The average ratio across all episodes is 1.4 for quarterly data and 0.8 for 
annual data. For the twenty-five episodes in both samples, the averages are 1.5 
and 1.1. It appears that the annual data understate output losses because time 
aggregation smooths the output series. Nonetheless, the two data sets yield 
similar pictures of the relative costs of different disinflations; for the twenty- 
five common observations. the correlation between the two ratios is .8  1. 
4. In the model of note 3, hysteresis can be introduced by  assuming y*  = y-,*  + cy, where y* 
is trend output and y is the deviation from trend. Under this assumption, a larger deviation implies 
a larger change in the trend, as suggested in the text. 167  What Determines the Sacrifice Ratio? 
Table 5.1  Disinflations: Quarterly Data 
Length in  Initial  Change in  Sacrifice 
Episode  Quarters  Inflation  Inflation  Ratio 
Australia 
74:2-78:  1 
82: 1-84: 1 
Canada 
74:2-76:4 
8  1  :2-85:2 
France 
74:2-76:4 
8 1: 1-86~4 
Germany 
65  14-67 :3 
73:l-77:3 
80:  1-86:3 
Italy 







































































































































For the quarterly data, the sacrifice ratios for individual episodes range from 
0.0 to 3.6. The ratio is positive in twenty-seven of  twenty-eight cases, sug- 
gesting that disinflation is almost always costly. There are sizable differences 
in average ratios across countries, as shown in table 5.3. The highest average 
ratios occur in Germany (2.9) and the United States (2.4), and the lowest in 
France (0.8) and the United Kingdom (0.8). A regression of the ratio on coun- 
try dummies yields an R2  of .47. 168  Laurence Ball 
Table 5.2  Disinflations: Annual Data 
Length in  Initial  Change in  Sacrifice 
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Table 5.2  (continued) 
Length in  Initial  Change in  Sacrifice 
















































































































































There is greater variation in the ratio with annual data, and a number of 
negative ratios. These results probably reflect greater measurement error aris- 
ing from cruder data. The R2 from a regression on country dummies is only 
.18. Similarly, the R2  is lower for annual than for quarterly data in most of the 
regressions below. 
To check the plausibility of my  sacrifice ratios, I have compared the ratios 
for the Volcker disinflation (the last U.S. episode) to previous estimates. Esti- 
mates of  the Volcker ratio include 4.2 (Blinder 1987), 2.9 (Sachs 1985), 2.8 170  Laurence Ball 
Table 5.3  Average Sacrifice Ratios by Country 
















































(Mankiw 1991), and 1.4 (Schelde-Andersen  1992).’ My estimates-1.8  with 
quarterly data and  1.9 with annual data-are  within the previous range but 
lower than average. Two features of my approach explain the relatively low 
ratios. First, I use the change in consumer price index (CPI) inflation as the 
denominator of  the ratio; most previous authors use the GDP deflator, which 
yields a smaller inflation gain under Volcker. Second, I assume that output is 
back at trend in  1984:4 (four quarters after the inflation trough of  1983:4), 
whereas others assume output losses through 1985. 
5.3  The Speed of  Disinflation 
explained. This section shows that the ratio is lower if disinflation is quick. 
5.3.1  Background 
The optimal speed of disinflation-the  choice between “gradualism” and 
“cold turkey”-is  a central issue for macroeconomic policy. One view is that 
gradualism is less costly because wages and prices possess inertia, and thus 
need time to adjust to a monetary tightening. This view has been formalized 
The next three sections ask whether variation in the sacrifice ratio can be 
5. Blinder’s ratio is 2.1 points of  unemployment per point of inflation. An Okun coefficient of 
two implies an output sacrifice ratio of 4.2. 171  What Determines the Sacrifice Ratio? 
by Taylor (1983), who presents a model of staggered wage adjustment in which 
quick disinflation reduces output but slow disinflation does not: 
A contrary view is that disinflation is less costly if it is quick. Sargent (1983) 
argues that a sharp regime-shift produces credibility, and hence a shift in ex- 
pectations that makes disinflation costless. Gradualism, by  contrast, “invites 
speculation about future reversals,” so that expectations do not adjust. Another 
argument for quick disinflation appears to follow from “menu cost” models of 
price adjustment. In these models, large shocks trigger greater price adjust- 
ment than small shocks; thus a large, one-time shift in monetary policy may 
be close to neutral, whereas a series of smaller tightenings reduces output sub- 
stantially. (This idea has not been formalized, however.) 
There is currently little evidence on these issues. The two sides make their 
cases by  appealing to historical examples, but the interpretation of individual 
episodes is controversial. (See, for example, the debate over Sargent’s account 
of the Poincart disinflation.) This study compares the sacrifice ratio and the 
speed of disinflation across my sizable sample of episodes. 
My basic measure of the speed of disinflation is the change in trend inflation 
per quarter-the  total change from peak to trough divided by the length of the 
episode. It is not clear, however, that this variable is the right summary statistic; 
in particular, the numerator and denominator of speed could influence the sac- 
rifice ratio in different ways. In models of staggered price adjustment, the ratio 
depends only on the length of  disinflation relative to the frequency of  price 
adjustment. A larger change in inflation over a given period increases the nu- 
merator and denominator of the ratio by the same proportion (Ball 1992). By 
contrast, Sargent’s view suggests that the change in inflation matters: a larger 
change is more likely to be perceived as a regime-shift, and thus produce a 
shift in expectations. In my empirical work, I test for separate effects of  the 
inflation change and the episode length. 
5.3.2  Basic Results 
Table 5.4 presents my basic results about the sacrifice ratio and the speed of 
disinflation. Columns 1 and 2 report simple regressions of the ratio on speed 
for the quarterly and annual data sets. In both cases, speed has a significantly 
negative coefficient: faster disinflations are less expensive. To  interpret the 
coefficients, consider the difference between the fitted sacrifice ratio when 
speed equals one and when speed equals one quarter. These speeds correspond 
to a five-point disinflation carried out over five quarters or over twenty quarters 
(or a ten-point disinflation over ten or forty quarters). For the quarterly data 
set, the sacrifice ratio is 1.8 when speed is one quarter but only 0.7 when speed 
is one. The results for annual data are similar. Thus faster disinflation produces 
substantially lower output losses. 
6. This result can be criticized on the grounds of theoretical robustness, as well as on the ernpiri- 
cal grounds discussed below. See Ball (1992). 172  Laurence Ball 
Table 5.4  The Sacrifice Ratio and the Speed of Disinflation (dependent 
variable: sacrifice ratio) 
Data Set 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Quarterly  Annual  Quarterly  Annual 
Constant  2.196 
(0.329) 
(0.586) 







1.512  1.045 
(0.307)  (0.325) 
-  I .677 
(0.637) 
-0.198 
(0.06 1  ) 
0. I20 
(0.034) 
,085  ,300 









Nore: Standard errors are in parenthcses. 
Columns 3 and 4 of  the table enter the change in inflation (AT) and the 
episode length as separate variables. The AT coefficient is significantly nega- 
tive, and the length coefficient is significantly positive. That is, greater speed 
reduces the sacrifice ratio regardless of whether it results from a larger inflation 
change over a given period or from a faster completion of a given change. The 
R2’s for this specification are considerably higher than when  AT  and length 
enter only through their ratio. 
I have  also estimated the equations in columns  1-4  with the addition of 
dummy variables for countries. These regressions isolate the within-country 
comovement of the sacrifice ratio and speed. The results are similar to table 
5.4, although somewhat weaker. The coefficient in the simple regression on 
speed is -0.9  (t  = 1.9) for quarterly data and -  1.2 (t = 1 .S) for annual data. 
In  the multiple regression, both coefficients are significant for the quarterly 
sample (t  >  2),  and the length coefficient is significant for the annual sample.’ 
5.3.3  A Potential Bias 
As discussed above, the effects of  supply shocks on the sacrifice ratio can 
be interpreted as measurement error. Measurement error in the dependent vari- 
able does not generally cause econometric problems, but it does in this applica- 
tion. The problem is that AT  is both the denominator of the sacrifice ratio and 
the numerator of  the independent variable speed (or, in columns 3 and 4, a 
separate regressor). For a given demand contraction, a favorable supply shock 
that increases AT  will reduce the estimated sacrifice ratio and increase speed, 
7. I have also experimented with a “random effects” specification, in which the error term con- 
tains a component common to episodes from the same country. Generalized least squares (GLS) 
estimates of  this model are very close to the OLS results reported in the text. 173  What Determines the Sacrifice Ratio? 
Table 5.5  The Speed of Disinflation: Subsamples (dependent variable: sacrifice 
ratio) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Quarterly  Quarterly  Annual  Annual 
Data Set  through 1972  after 1972  through 1972  after 1972 
Constant  2.478  2.160  1.932  1.289 
(0.5  17)  (0.493)  (0.493)  (0.387) 
(0.787)  (0.953)  (  1.064)  (0.789) 
Speed = Adlength  -1.516  -1.718  -3.024  -1.044 
82  ,279  ,106  .27 1  .017 
Sample size  8  20  20  45 
Nore: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
creating a spurious negative relation between the two. I now check whether 
this problem has an important effect on my results. 
I take two approaches. First, table 5.5 regresses the sacrifice ratio on speed 
for disinflations ending by  1972 and disinflations ending after 1972. Aggregate 
supply was less stable in the second period, and so the negative bias arising 
from supply shocks should be larger. With quarterly data, however, the speed 
coefficients for both subsamples are close to the coefficient for the whole sam- 
ple. With annual data, the coefficient is more negative in the first period than 
in the second, the opposite of  what we  would expect if  supply shocks had 
created bias. These results suggest that my  basic findings are not driven by 
supply shocks. Similar results arise if speed is replaced by  AT and length, or 
if the sample is split at 1984 (before the 1986 oil price decline). 
As a second approach to the supply-shock problem, I estimate the effect of 
speed using instrumental variables (IV), with length as an instrument. Length 
is clearly correlated with speed = Adlength. And length is plausibly uncorre- 
lated with the errors arising from supply shocks. For a given path of aggregate 
demand, a beneficial supply shock is likely to increase An, but not to reduce 
length: the shock does not cause disinflation to end sooner. Thus, increases in 
speed resulting from decreases in length should not be negatively correlated 
with the errors in the sacrifice ratio. (Indeed, beneficial supply shocks near the 
end of  an episode may  increase its length by  extending the inflation decline 
beyond the end of tight policy. Note that a number of episodes end in the bene- 
ficial-shock year of 1986. In this case, the IV coefficient on speed has a positive 
rather than negative bias.)* 
8. My approach assumes that the demand contraction during disinflation is exogenous. If policy 
responds to supply shocks, there are scenarios in which the negative bias in OLS extends to IV. 
This is the case, for example, if a favorable supply shock causes policymakers to shorten disinfla- 
tion because an inflation target is met more quickly. In such a case, the identification problem 
appears insuperable. 174  Laurence Ball 
Table 5.6  The Speed of Disinflation: Instrumental Variables 
(instrument = Iflength) 
(1)  (2) 
Quarterly Data  Annual Data 
Constant  2.077  3.633 
(0.454)  (I  ,320) 
Speed = Adlength  -  1.301  -6.477 
(0.867)  (2.963) 
Sample size  28  65 
Nore: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Table  5.6 presents instrumental variables  estimates, with  the  inverse of 
length as the instrument. (l/length is more highly correlated with speed than 
is length.) For the quarterly sample, the coefficient on speed is close to the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficient. For the annual sample, the coefficient 
is larger in absolute value, but the difference is not statistically significant. 
Once again, there is no evidence of negative bias in my basic results. 
5.4  Nominal Wage Rigidity 
5.4.1  Background 
Comparisons of  macroeconomic performance in different countries often 
emphasize differences in nominal wage rigidity (e.g., Bruno and Sachs 1985). 
These differences are attributed to wage-setting institutions such as the fre- 
quency of  adjustment, the degree of  indexation, and the synchronization of 
adjustment across sectors. Many authors argue, for example, that three-year 
staggered contracts make U.S. wages rigid, whereas one-year synchronized 
contracts make Japanese wages flexible. These differences are used to explain 
cross-country variation in the costs of disinflation, such as the high costs in the 
United States and the lower costs in Japan (e.g., Gordon 1982). 
In contrast to this tradition, recent “New Keynesian” research has deempha- 
sized wage-setting institutions. New Keynesians argue that monetary nonneu- 
trality arises largely from rigidities in output prices rather than wages (e.g., 
Mankiw 1990). To the extent that price rigidity determines the cost of disinfla- 
tion, wage-setting institutions are unimportant. 
Once again, the relevant empirical evidence consists mainly of  informal 
comparisons of a few episodes. I now investigate whether wage rigidity helps 
explain the variation in the sacrifice ratio in my  ample.^ 
9. Bruno-Sachs and others report extensive cross-country comparisons of wage rigidity and the 
effects of  supply shocks. To  my knowledge, however, this study and Schelde-Andersen (1992) are 
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Table 5.7  The Sacrifice Ratio and Wage Rigidity (quarterly results) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Constant  2.067  1.593  1.841  1.542 
(0.400)  (0.446)  (0.302)  (0.406) 
Wage responsiveness  -0.179  -0.150 
(0.104)  (0.087) 
Contract duration  -0.313  -0.306 
(0.194)  (0.162) 
AT  -0.190  -0.205 
(0.059)  (0.058) 
Length  0.115  0.115 
(0.033)  (0.032) 
82  ,069  .352  ,056  ,366 
Sample size  28  28  28  28 
Note:  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
5.4.2  Basic Results 
My basic measure of wage rigidity is Bruno and Sachs’s index of “nominal 
wage responsiveness.” For a given country, Bruno and Sachs assign a value of 
zero, one, or two to each of three variables: the duration of wage agreements, 
the degree of  indexation, and the degree of  synchronization. Higher values 
mean greater flexibility (that is, shorter, more indexed, and more synchronized 
agreements). The wage responsiveness index is the sum of  the three values, 
and thus runs from zero to six. I regress the sacrifice ratio on the index, and 
also experiment with the three components. 
The results for quarterly and annual data are presented in tables 5.7 and 
5.8. In both cases, I report simple regressions on the responsiveness index and 
regressions that include AIT and disinflation length. I also use the duration of 
agreements in place of the total index. Duration is the only component of the 
index that is significant by itself.I0 
The results are quite similar across specifications. The coefficients on re- 
sponsiveness or duration are negative, implying that greater flexibility reduces 
the sacrifice ratio. The statistical significance of these results is borderline: 
t-statistics range from 1.8 to 2.1 for annual data and from 1.6 to 1.9 for quar- 
terly data. The point estimates imply large effects of flexibility. In column 1 of 
the annual results, for example, the fitted value of the sacrifice ratio is 1.4 for 
a responsiveness of zero but only 0.5 for the maximum responsiveness of six. 
(Switzerland has a rating of zero, and Australia, Denmark, and New Zealand 
have ratings of six.) The results for duration show that it is the most important 
component of  the index. In column 3 of  the annual results, raising duration 
10. For these regressions, the annual data set is reduced from sixty-five to fifty-eight observa- 
tions, because the Bruno-Sachs index is missing for several countries. 176  Laurence Ball 
Table 5.8  The Sacrifice Ratio and Wage Rigidity (annual results) 
Constant  1.369 
(0.326) 


















1.280  0.649 
(0.270)  (0.356) 





,059  ,208 
58  58 
(0.168)  (0,155) 
Note; Standard errors are in parentheses. 
from zero to two reduces the fitted ratio from 1.3 to 0.6. (Zero means wage 
agreements of three years, and two means agreements of a year or less.) 
5.4.3  A Variation 
As an alternative explanatory variable, I use the index of nominal wage ri- 
gidity in Grubb, Jackman, and Layard (1983). This variable is quite different 
from the Bruno-Sachs index: it is constructed from a time-series regression of 
wages on prices and unemployment. An advantage of the Grubb index is that 
it flexibly measures the overall rigidity of wages-it  does not rely on arbitrary 
assumptions about the importance of particular contract provisions. An obvi- 
ous disadvantage is that the Grubb variable is endogenous. Factors that directly 
influence the sacrifice ratio, such as the initial level of inflation or the preva- 
lence of incomes policies, are likely to influence the speed of wage adjustment 
that Grubb measures. To  address this problem,  I  estimate the effects of  the 
Grubb index using instrumental variables, with Bruno and Sachs’s variables as 
instruments. This approach isolates the effects of rigidity arising from wage- 
setting institutions. 
Table 5.9 reports results for both quarterly and annual data. Columns  1 and 
2 present OLS regressions of the sacrifice ratio on the Grubb index, AT,  and 
disinflation length. For both data sets, the Grubb variable has a significantly 
positive coefficient. Columns 3 and 4 report instrumental variables estimates; 
the instruments are the three components of the wage-responsiveness  variable 
and another Bruno-Sachs index measuring “corporatism” (the extent of union- 
ization, the centralization of bargaining, and so on). The instrumental variables 
estimates are close to the OLS estimates, although the statistical significance 
becomes borderline. The results are reasonably stable when various subsets of 
the instruments are used. Overall, the results confirm the  finding that wage 
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Table 5.9  The Sacrifice Ratio and Wage Rigidity: Grubb Measure 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Quarterly Data  Annual Data  Quarterly Data  Annual Data 
Ordinary  Ordinary 
Least 
Procedure  Squares 
Constant  0.731 
(0.324) 
Wage rigidity  0.377 
(0.156) 
AT  -0.201 
(0.056) 
Length  0.125 
(0.031) 


































Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
5.5  Other Results 
This section reports additional results that are either negative or inconclu- 
sive. Future research should explore these issues further. 
5.5.1  Initial Inflation 
Ball, Mankiw, and Romer (1988) show that trend inflation influences the 
output-inflation trade-off in New Keynesian models. Higher inflation reduces 
the extent of nominal rigidity, and thus steepens the short-run Phillips curve. 
Ball, Mankiw, and Romer show that cross-country  evidence strongly supports 
this prediction. A special case of the prediction is that the sacrifice ratio during 
disinflation is decreasing in the initial level of trend inflation. I now test this 
idea with my sample of disinflations. For both quarterly and annual data, table 
5.10 reports regressions  of  the ratio on initial inflation, no.  I present simple 
regressions and regressions that include length, AT, and contract duration (the 
best-fitting set of variables from the previous section). 
The results for the two data sets are rather different. With quarterly data, the 
simple regression  shows a negative effect of no,  as predicted by theory. The 
t-statistic  is  1.9. The coefficient  in the multiple regression is similar in size, 
but statistically insignificant (r = 1  .O).  This weaker result reflects collinearity 
between mTT0  and AT: inflation tends to fall more in episodes when it is initially 
high. (Note that the coefficient on AT  also becomes insignificant.) Overall, it 
is difficult to identify separate effects of T"  and AT, but the data are at least 
suggestive that no  has a negative effect. 
The annual data, by contrast, provide no support for this hypothesis. In both 
specifications, the coefficient is not only insignificant, but has the wrong sign 
(positive). 
The differences between the quarterly and annual results arise from differ- 178  Laurence Ball 
Table 5.10  The Sacrifice Ratio and Initial Inflation (dependent variable: sacrifice 
ratio) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Quarterly Data  Quarterly Data  Annual Data  Annual Data 
Constant  2.093 






R’  .086 













0.661  0.480 
(0.307)  (0.4  13) 
0.014  0.040 







,015  .203 
58  58 
Noret  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
ences in the samples of countries. When the annual sample is restricted to the 
countries for which quarterly data exist, the results are similar to the quarterly 
results. It is not clear why the choice of countries is so important. It is also not 
clear why the effect of no  is weaker than the effect of trend inflation on the 
Phillips curve found by Ball, Mankiw, and Romer. 
5.5.2  Incomes Policies 
If  inflation possesses inertia, there may be a role for governments to inter- 
vene directly in wage- and price-setting during disinflation. By mandating a 
slowdown in the growth of  prices, governments can reduce inertia and thus 
reduce the sacrifice ratio. This logic has led to wage-price controls or other 
incomes policies during many disinflations. 
To investigate the effects of incomes policies, I must first measure them. For 
each of  the twenty-eight episodes in the quarterly data set, I consulted the 
historical record to see whether incomes policies were employed. My  main 
sources were the OECD’s Economic Outlook and surveys of incomes policies 
(Ulman and Flanagan 1971; Flanagan, Soskice, and Ulman 1983). I create two 
dummy variables. The first, INCM, equals one if mandatory incomes policies 
were employed at anytime during the episode. A mandatory policy is defined 
as one in which legal restrictions are placed on the majority of  wages or  the 
majority of output prices. According to my survey, such policies were imposed 
in six of the twenty-eight episodes (United States 1969-71,  Canada 1974-76, 
France  1974-76,  France  198  1-86,  United Kingdom  1965-66,  and  United 
Kingdom 1975-78).  The second variable, INCV, equals one if voluntary in- 
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voluntary guideposts, jawboning, and negotiated settlements with business and 
labor. Voluntary policies occurred in another twelve of the episodes. 
Table 5.11 regresses the sacrifice ratio on INCM and INCV, both with and 
without additional controls. When both dummies are included, the results are 
disappointing: INCV has a positive coefficient and INCM has a negative coef- 
ficient, and both  are  insignificant. When  INCV  is  excluded, however,  the 
INCM coefficient is almost significant in the regression with additional con- 
trols (t = 1.8). The coefficient implies that a mandatory policy reduces the 
sacrifice ratio by  0.6. 
One interpretation of these results is that voluntary policies are ineffective 
but mandatory policies do reduce the sacrifice ratio. This finding is not very 
robust, however. The results could be checked by  extending the measures of 
incomes policies to the larger annual sample. 
5.5.3  Openness 
As stressed by  Romer (1991), basic  macroeconomics suggests a relation 
between the output-inflation trade-off and the openness of the economy-the 
share of imports in total spending. In a more open economy, the exchange-rate 
appreciation arising from a monetary contraction has a larger direct effect on 
the price level. Consequently, inflation falls more for a given policy shift: the 
sacrifice ratio is smaller. 
This idea receives no support from my  data. Table 5.12 reports regressions 
of  the sacrifice ratio on the imports/GNP ratio (taken from Romer). The effects 
of  imports/GNP are very  insignificant for both  quarterly and  annual data. 
These results cast doubt on Romer's argument that openness influences average 
inflation by changing the output-inflation trade-off. 
Table 5.11  The Sacrifice Ratio and Incomes Policies (quarterly data) (dependent 
variable: sacrifice ratio) 
















1.561  1.539 
(0.195)  (0.424) 
-0.573  -0.351 
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Table 5.12  The Sacrifice Ratio and Openness 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Quarterly Data  Annual Data  Quarterly Data  Annual Data 
Constant  1.363  0.828 
(0.534)  (0.302) 
(2.4  15)  (0.966) 
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Note:  Standard errors are in parentheses 
5.6  Conclusion 
This paper constructs sacrifice ratios for a sample of disinflations and asks 
whether variation  in the ratio can be explained. I find that the ratio is lower 
when disinflation is quick, and when wage-setting is more flexible. Openness 
has no effect on the ratio, and the effects of initial inflation and incomes poli- 
cies are unclear. 
My analysis uses a new measure of the sacrifice ratio based on several as- 
sumptions about the behavior of trend output. Future research should check 
the robustness of the results to variations in my assumptions. Some evidence 
of robustness is provided by Schelde-Andersen (1992), whose study was car- 
ried out independently of mine. Schelde-Andersen estimates  sacrifice ratios 
using a substantially different approach. For example, he measures the ratio 
using a fixed period for every country (1979-88), and he examines unemploy- 
ment as well as output losses. His ranking of sacrifice ratios across countries 
differs considerably from my table 5.3. Nonetheless, Schelde-Andersen and I 
reach similar conclusions about the determinants of the ratio. In particular, he 
confirms my findings about both the speed of disinflation and nominal  wage 
rigidity. 
Do my results about speed imply that cold-turkey disinflation is preferable 
to gradualism? This conclusion is warranted only if the cost of disinflation is 
measured by the total output loss. The welfare loss in a given quarter might be 
a convex function of the output loss, as macro theorists usually assume. In this 
case,  gradualism  has  the  advantage  of  spreading  the  losses  over  a  longer 
period. Since we do not know the shape of the social loss function, it is difficult 
to determine the optimal speed of disinflation.  At a minimum, however, my 
results refute the view that gradualism makes disinflation costless. 181  What Determines the Sacrifice Ratio? 
Another possible implication of  my  results is that government should en- 
courage greater wage flexibility, for example, by limiting the length of labor 
contracts. Such a policy is suggested by Bosworth (1981) and others, and can 
be justified in principle by the negative externalities from long contracts (Ball 
1987). My  results suggest that the welfare gains from shorter contracts are 
large: the recessions arising from disinflation are dampened considerably. 
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Comment  Benjamin M. Friedman 
Laurence Ball’s paper is a useful contribution to a literature with old anteced- 
ents as well as much contemporary policy  import.  The central questions at 
issue are plain: what is the cost of disinflation, and what-if  anything-can  a 
country do to reduce that cost? Ball frames these questions within the context 
of  recent  contributions  by  such well  known  researchers  as Arthur  Okun, 
Thomas Sargent, Barry Bosworth, and Robert J. Gordon, but it is also appro- 
priate to recall the earlier incarnation of this discussion in the debate between 
Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman over “gradualism” in disinflation poli- 
cies, and still prior developments as well. In the United States within the past 
decade or so, discussion of this issue has mostly focused on the “Volcker disin- 
flation” of the early I980s, the “Greenspan disinflation” that accompanied the 
1990-91  recession, and the proposed (but not enacted) congressional resolu- 
tion directing the Federal Reserve System to pursue a monetary policy leading 
to zero inflation.’ In each case, a central question has been the costs-costs  in 
terms of foregone output, jobs, incomes, profits, capital formation, and so on- 
that disinflation involves. 
At least in the United States, economic thinking about these costs has fol- 
lowed an interesting evolution over the post-World War I1 era. During roughly 
the first half of this period, the desire to maintain  a higher utilization  of the 
economy’s resources  (that is, lower unemployment)  without incurring ever- 
increasing price inflation presented macroeconomics  with its primary policy 
objective and, in so doing, motivated the leading topic on the field’s research 
agenda.2  The conceptual vehicle hypothesized to make greater utilization with- 
Benjamin M. Friedman is the William Joseph Maier Professor of Political Economy at Harvard 
University and director of the Program in Monetary Economics at the National Bureau of  Eco- 
nomic Research. 
1. See H.R. 409, IOlst Cong., 1st sess. 
2. The one other macroeconomic objective that commanded perhaps equal attention in the re- 
search literature of the time was raising the economy’s long-run growth rate, but that idea had 
much less visible impact on the discussion of  actual macroeconomic policy. 183  What Determines the Sacrifice Ratio? 
out ever-increasing inflation achievable was the Phillips curve: a stable and 
exploitable trade-off between unemployment and inflation. Given such a trade- 
off, an appropriate policy could permanently  achieve lower unemployment 
than would be consistent with price stability. Prices would rise, but at a stable 
rate  as  long  as  unemployment  was  itself  steady.  Specifically, continually 
below-normal unemployment need not imply continually increasing inflation. 
By the time most economists had given up on the idea of a stable and ex- 
ploitable unemployment-inflation trade-off, the ongoing U.S.  inflation rate had 
become high by historical peacetime standards. Now the question heading the 
research and policy agenda in macroeconomics became how to reduce that 
inflation while holding to a minimum the associated costs. A theory promising 
costless disinflation, therefore, became to its time what the theory of the stable 
trade-off had been in its own earlier context. 
Macroeconomics again proved up to the challenge. Throughout this period, 
including the heyday of  the stable trade-off and its aftermath, the accepted 
understanding had been that macroeconomic policy influenced inflation pri- 
marily, if not only, by affecting nonfinancial economic activity. Keynesian the- 
ory typically summarized the underlying dependence of inflation on the econo- 
my’s utilization of its real resources via some form of explicit Phillips curve 
for either prices or wages, importantly including later elaborations that allowed 
for the role of inflation expectations. The monetarist alternative, couched pri- 
marily in terms of money growth and growth of nominal income, was necessar- 
ily more vague about the connection to real economic activity, but Friedman 
and Schwartz’s (1963) work and the flood of subsequent studies that it inspired 
typically showed a substantial effect of monetary policy on real activity before 
the associated effect on inflation appeared. 
By the late  1970s, when U.S. inflation was approaching the double-digit 
range, this line of thinking connecting disinflation to underutilization  of  re- 
sources had even achieved something of a consensus on the quantitative mag- 
nitude of the short-run trade-offs involved. When Okun (1978) surveyed a vari- 
ety of  estimates of the likely real costs of disinflation in the United  States, 
the answer he found was that each one-percentage-point reduction in inflation 
achieved by monetary policy would require between two and six “point-years’’ 
of unemployment, with a median estimate of three point-years. Such an unfa- 
vorable trade-off-at  the median, fifteen point-years of unemployment to cut 
the inflation rate by  five percentage points-constituted  a clear discourage- 
ment to an actively disinflationary policy. 
By contrast, the radically different view of the way in which monetary pol- 
icy affects the economy, developed during the 1970s by Lucas (1972, 1973) 
and Sargent and Wallace (1973, maintained that central-bank actions that are 
anticipated in advance affect the setting of prices and wages directly through 
their effect on expectations, with little or no consequence for real economic 
activity. Hence disinflation is costless as long as the public receives “credible” 
warning of  the central bank’s actions, as summarized in the growth of  some 184  Laurence Ball 
appropriate  measure  of  the money  stock. By announcing  its money-growth 
target in  advance, and then ensuring that actual money  growth followed the 
target  closely, the central  bank  could  thus achieve any desired  reduction  in 
inflation without consequence, adverse or otherwise, to the real economy. It is 
difficult to judge the exact extent of adherence to this alternative perspective 
by the outset of the 1980s, or the extent to which it influenced actual monetary 
policy decisions, but neither appears to have been negligible. 
Alas, this exercise in creative optimism proved no more consistent with ac- 
tual behavior  than the claim of  a stable trade-off  that  had preceded  it. The 
Volcker disinflation destroyed the belief of most economists (and probably a 
still greater proportion of noneconomists)  in the prospect of costless disinfla- 
tion. In the wake of  the early  1980s experience, featuring major disinflation 
accompanied by the largest business recession since the 1930s, it is far more 
plausible to believe that monetary policy does indeed affect price inflation pri- 
marily, if not only, by affecting nonfinancial economic activity-and,  further, 
that the magnitude of these effects is about as was previously supposed. It is 
to Ball’s credit that the notion of  costless disinflation never enters his paper. 
There are few references to “credibility” either. 
Although Ball’s methodology based on foregone real output delivers more 
favorable estimates, what is striking about the Volcker disinflation is just how 
closely in line the resulting unemployment was with prior experience and esti- 
mates. Based on a “full employment” benchmark of 6 percent unemployment, 
the cost of each one percentage point of disinflation for the overall gross do- 
mestic product (GDP) deflator in the 1980s  experience was about two and one- 
half point-years of unemployment-slightly  better than Okun’s median esti- 
mate of three, but well within the range of the then-conventional models that 
he surveyed. On the alternative assumption that the “full employment” unem- 
ployment rate was 6 percent at the beginning of the 1980s but declined to 5 
percent by mid-decade, the cost per point of disinflation was slightly worse 
than Okun’s median estimate. 
By contrast, Ball’s estimates based on real output movements show a sacri- 
fice ratio of  1.9 percent for the 1979-83  U.S. experience (1.8 percent in the 
quarterly data), versus 3.4 percent in 1969-71  and I .6 percent in 1974-76  (2.9 
percent and 2.4 percent, respectively, in the quarterly data). But his use of the 
loss in real output (relative to trend) in the numerator and the slowing of the 
consumer price index in the denominator of his ratio presumably leads to an 
understatement  of  the costliness  of  the  Volcker disinflation compared with 
analogous calculations based on unemployment and the GDP deflator. The use 
of output loss rather than rise in unemployment,  as a measure of the cost of 
disinflation, raises particularly  interesting  substantive issues. The two meas- 
ures would result in equivalent comparisons over time if such aspects of mac- 
roeconomic activity as productivity growth, labor-force participation, popula- 
tion growth, and the like were constant. But U.S. productivity growth improved 
in the early years of the 1983-90  expansion, compared with the average experi- 185  What Determines the Sacrifice Ratio? 
ence of the 1970s, and so the cost of disinflation in terms of  output was less 
than  the  cost  in terms  of  unemployment,  even though labor-force growth 
slowed. 
Given that these two measures of “sacrifice” are not equivalent in practice, 
the most interesting substantive question raised by  the choice between them is 
who is doing the sacrificing. As usual in such matters, if  the winners from 
disinflation could readily compensate the losers, this question would not arise 
and the output shortfall would be the obvious measure to use. Making such 
transfers is typically not straightforward (or even possible) in modem indus- 
trial societies, however, and so the matter of who gains at the expense of whom 
is very much to the point.3 
In contrast to the Volcker disinflation, the Greenspan disinflation featured 
only a modest unemployment rate (never as great as 8 percent) but extraordi- 
narily slow output gr~wth.~  In addition to the 2.2 percent drop in output during 
the 1990-91  recession, which lasted three calendar quarters, output grew by 
only 2.6 percent in the year and a half before the recession began. Output then 
expanded by  only 2.9 percent in the initial year and a half after the recession 
ended, versus an average 9.8 percent gain in the comparable stage of the eight 
previous postrecession recoveries since World War 11.  Similarly, although slow 
labor-force growth held unemployment down, employment expanded by  just 
0.1 percent in the first year and a half of recovery in 1991-92,  versus an average 
5.4 percent gain in the eight prior recoveries. In light of  Medoff‘s (1992a, 
1992b) finding that job availability is the macroeconomic variable most highly 
correlated with standard consumer confidence measures as well as with voting 
patterns in national elections, the Greenspan disinflation presumably contrib- 
uted to incumbent president George Bush’s loss in the 1992 election. 
Several other specifics of  Ball’s  paper bear comment, in addition to the 
choice of output versus either employment or unemployment to measure cost. 
First, Ball explicitly focuses only on episodes in which countries have reduced 
inflation from “moderate” starting points. No inflation observation in his data 
set is as great as 20 percent. This choice presents a sharp contrast to the ap- 
proach of  Sargent (1982), who, in the spirit of  Cagan’s (1956) classic study 
of the demand for money, deliberately focused on hyperinflations. The basic 
methodological question at issue here is what can be learned about behavior 
under “normal” conditions from studying extreme situations. The same ques- 
tion is also relevant to the theoretical underpinnings of  the debate over costs 
of disinflation, in that Lucas’s (1973) original evidence for a theory of aggre- 
gate supply behavior based on producers’ inability to distinguish absolute from 
relative price movements rested mostly on outlier observations for Argentina 
and Paraguay. 
3. See the discussion of this subject in Friedman (1992). 
4. Romer and Romer (1992)  provide evidence documenting a deliberate tightening of U.S. mon- 
etary policy for purposes of disinflation beginning in 1988, and so comparisons between this epi- 
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Second, the price-output dynamics that Ball posits require some explana- 
tion, to say the least. Ball’s procedure assumes that output is at its natural rate 
at the time that inflation  peaks  and, subsequently,  that output returns to its 
natural rate a year after inflation has bottomed. But if there is no shortfall of 
output at the peak, why does inflation begin to come down? And, even more 
puzzling, if  there is still an output shortfall at the trough, why does inflation 
go back up? In both  1972 and  1977, for example, U.S. inflation  was rising 
quite rapidly  (see figure 5.1). Yet  by  Ball’s estimate  output was still below 
trend in both instances. In principle, the net impact of these peculiarities of the 
measurement of the output lost in disinflations could be either to enlarge or to 
shrink  the resulting  estimate  of  the  sacrifice ratio for  any  specific episode. 
Given  the  small average  size of  Ball’s estimates, however, the  latter seems 
more likely. 
Third, Ball’s Hayekian finding that faster disinflations require less sacrifice 
raises an important problem of  potential reverse causation. The basic question 
at issue in this regard is why central banks do what they do. As in most conven- 
tional analysis of the effect of economic policies, Ball takes monetary policy 
(or whatever negative aggregate demand shocks deliver disinflations) as exoge- 
nous with respect to the behavior he is investigating. But what if central banks 
pursue their presumed  goal  of disinflation  more rigorously  when  they have 
reason to believe  that  the  short-run trade-offs  associated with doing so are 
more favorable?  Ball partially  addresses this question by  including country 
dummies in his regressions,  and also by  testing for effects of supply shocks, 
but the issue remains unresolved. 
Moreover, even if Ball’s conclusion in this regard were persuasively robust, 
any attempt to find in this result  evidence for sacrifice-lessening  effects of 
greater credibility that might be associated with faster disinflation immediately 
runs afoul of what the specific country comparisons imply in this context. For 
example, Ball’s calculation of a greater sacrifice ratio for Germany (2.1 per- 
cent) than for Italy (1.6 percent) in the 1980s is hardly consistent with a large 
role for credibility effects. Dornbusch’s (1  990) comparisons based on disinfla- 
tion and unemployment  during this period  make the point even plainer:  9.6 
point-years of unemployment per point of disinflation in Germany, 7.5 in the 
Netherlands, 4.0 in France, and 2.2 in Italy. Ball’s discussion notwithstanding, 
comparisons like these are far more suggestive of some form of  nonlinearity 
such that disinflation is less costly when it begins from higher initial inflation 
levels. (A straightforward extension of the same idea would also incorporate 
Sargent’s finding on the end of hyperinflations.) 
Finally, what  about the recently  fashionable  talk  in the  United  States of 
pressing disinflation to the point of achieving zero inflation? Ball’s basic find- 
ing brings a useful note of reality to this discussion: “Intentional demand con- 
tractions  are essentially  the  only  source of  two-point  declines  in trend  in- 
flation.” 
In contrast to this sobering conclusion based on the historical record, the 187  What Determines the Sacrifice Ratio? 
“zero inflation” resolution recently introduced in the U.S. Congress contained 
not one reference to any loss of jobs, any sacrifice of output, or any shortfall 
of  investment that a successful disinflationary  policy would no doubt entail. 
Instead, the resolution simply stated that “zero inflation will promote the high- 
est possible sustainable level of employment” and “the maximum sustainable 
rate of economic growth,” and, further, that “zero inflation will encourage the 
highest possible rate of savings and investment.” And in contrast to any men- 
tion of the higher interest rates that would have to deliver what Ball calls an 
“intentional demand contraction”-he  concludes that “a significant tightening 
of monetary policy is not only necessary  for disinflation but also, it appears, 
sufficient”-the  proposed resolution merely asserted that “zero inflation will 
reduce interest rates to, and maintain them at, their lowest possible levels.” 
The problem is not that  any of  these claims was necessarily  wrong as a 
description of conditions that might prevail once zero inflation were achieved 
but rather that they signaled no recognition whatever of  the economic events 
that, as Ball’s careful analysis shows, past experience indicates would be likely 
to accompany the path to zero inflation from any given beginning point. To be 
sure, pursuing the goal of price stability is an appropriate, indeed highly im- 
portant, priority for public policy. But to do so in a disingenuous manner that 
obscures rather than confronts the broader implications that such a policy en- 
tails is likely, in the end, to prove destructive of just those institutions-includ- 
ing, most prominently, central-bank independence-that  can best foster that 
goal. 
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Comment  Stephen G. Cecchetti 
Laurence Ball’s paper examining the impact of monetary policy on output and 
prices relies on several assumptions that I believe need further consideration. 
The purpose of this Comment is to highlight these assumptions and then show 
how small changes can have a large impact on certain aspects of the results. 
While Ball focuses his attention on the cross-sectional correlation of his esti- 
mates of the sacrijice rafio  with various measures of the economic and political 
environment, I will direct my attention to the prior problem of calculating the 
impact of monetary policy on output and prices. 
I begin with three points that I believe should guide the analysis. First, Ball 
presumes that information about monetary influences on the economy exists 
only in regard to the episodes in which inflation is reduced and output falls. 
This ignores the periods in which  inflation increases and output rises. Why 
aren’t  we referring to these  estimates as the  “benefit ratio” from increasing 
inflation? While there may be an inherent asymmetry in the impact of mone- 
tary policy on output and prices, it seems unnatural to presume at the outset 
that there is no information on policy shifts that move toward monetary loosen- 
ing. As a practical matter, the question of asymmetry is an empirical one. But 
it would seem that barring any evidence to the contrary, the episodes in which 
inflation increases should provide as much information as those in which in- 
flation declines. 
The second observation regarding Ball’s approach is that it depends on the 
assumed dynamics of output and inflation in the absence of monetary shocks. 
In computing the output loss from a particular disinflation, Ball makes an as- 
sumption about trend output-namely,  that it is at its trend level at the begin- 
ning of the episode and returns to the trend level four quarters after the episode. 
He further assumes that inflation reductions that occur during the episode are 
permanent. Given these two strong assumptions, that trend output is piecewise 
linear (in logs) and that the inflation process has no autoregressive component, 
some sensitivity analysis would seem useful. As we know, assumptions about 
stationarity and detrending often make a substantial difference in calculations 
of this type. 
Stephen G.  Cecchetti is professor of economics at The Ohio State University  and a research 
The author thanks Anil Kashyap and Robin Lumsdaine for discussions and comments. 
associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 189  What Determines the Sacrifice Ratio? 
My final observation  about the Ball calculations concerns his implicit as- 
sumptions about the nature of monetary (and real) shocks. Ball assumes that a 
monetary shock induces the recessions he observes, and that the path of output 
and  inflation  declines  during each of the episodes  he examines are caused 
solely by the shift to tight money. But in order to measure the impact of mone- 
tary policy, we need to identify the policy  shocks. This is not an easy task. 
How is it that we know that aggregate supply shocks are not occurring during 
these periods? Ball suggests that such shocks create measurement errors in his 
estimates of the impact of policy on output and inflation, but I believe that the 
difficulty is more serious. 
To  see why, let me give a simple example of the type of information we 
really need to estimate the quantity of interest. Recall that in making his mea- 
surements, Ball examines only cases in which inflation and output move in the 
same direction. To  see how this causes problems, take a case in which an ad- 
verse supply shock hits the economy. In the absence of any change in monetary 
policy, there would be a temporary fall in output and a temporary rise in infla- 
tion. But in fact, the monetary authority has the option of accommodating the 
shock. If  monetary policy becomes looser, then inflation will rise and output 
will jud to fall. We  actually need to identify these shocks to estimate Ball’s 
sacrifice ratio, otherwise we have no idea whether observed output movements 
are  the  consequence  of  monetary  policy  shifts  or of  other  shocks  to  the 
economy. 
I now proceed to use these observations to create an estimate of the sacrifice 
ratio that is based on a structural identification of aggregate demand and aggre- 
gate supply shocks. Once I have estimated the responses of output and inflation 
to these shocks in a dynamic context, I can estimate the impact of  a shock 
using the impulse response functions, and proceed to study its sensitivity to 
assumptions about the dynamics of output and inflation. 
The structural approach addresses my first and third concerns with Ball’s 
methods. First, it uses information about all output and inflation movements, 
not just inflation declines associated with recessions. Presumably, we obtain 
information about the impact of aggregate demand policy on output and prices 
from upturns as well as downturns. In addition, by identifying the shocks ex- 
plicitly, we make clear the time path of  the effects. Most important, we can 
allow for effects that last far beyond the cyclical trough and take seriously the 
implication of recent research on the persistence of output fluctuations which 
suggests that the effect of demand shocks may be quite long-lived. I will then 
proceed to my second concern and investigate the importance of assumptions 
about detrending (or differencing) for the results.  Ultimately, the question is 
whether the data actually give us any useful information about the response of 
output to policy in this context. 
Following Blanchard and Quah (1989), I identify and estimate the aggregate 
demand shock, and hence the sacrifice ratio, by assuming that aggregate de- 
mand shocks have no long-run real effects. I study the following model: 190  Laurence Ball 
where y is the log of output, IT is inflation, u is an aggregate supply shock, v is 
an aggregate demand shock, and the Ao(L)s  are polynomials in the lag operator 
L. For the moment, I am assuming that inflation and output are both stationary 
in first differences. The innovations in (1) are assumed to be i.i.d. and uncorre- 
lated contemporaneously. The Blanchard-Quah restriction that the aggregate 
demand shocks have no long-run effect on output implies that the long-run 
effect of v on y is zero, and so Alz(  I) = 0. 
Using (1) I can compute the impact of an innovation to v,  on both inflation 
and the level of output. For inflation, the impact of a unit innovation to v, over 
a horizon T, is just the sum of the coefficients in A,,('): 
where aiZ2  is the coefficient on L  in A,,(L). The impact of v on the level  of 
output can be computed from the coefficients in A&)  as 
(3) 
The relative impact of monetary policy on output and inflation is just the ratio 
of  these: 
(4) 
The estimated effect of monetary policy in (4) depends on the assumptions 
about the degree of differencing necessary to induce stationarity in output and 
inflation, as well as the horizon T. To see why, consider the value of S"(T)  in 
the limit as T tends toward infinity. For the case in (l),  where both IT and y are 
assumed to be I(1), the impact of a shock on the level of  both inflation and 
output will be permanent and will tend to some constant. It immediately fol- 
lows that the cumulative impact of the shock in (3) will become infinite, while 
the impact on inflation will be finite, and so limT+Jv(T) will go to infinity. 
Alternatively, if we assume that inflation is I( l), while output is stationary 
about a deterministic trend, since the Blanchard-Quah identification constrains 
the impact of  an innovation to v to be zero in the long run, the result is that 
(after redefining S, appropriately) limT+-Sv(T)  = 0. 
This implies that it only makes sense to examine cases in which the horizon 
is relatively short-I  will look at five years. In addition, since the experiment 
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makes no sense to study the case in which inflation is stationary in levels. If 
one were to assume that T,  were mean-reverting, then by assumption no shock 
is capable of reducing inflation, and the denominator of S, would always tend 
toward zero. 
Following in this spirit, I have estimated the value of Sv  using the Blanchard- 
Quah identification, setting T  equal to five years, and approximating the restric- 
tion that AJl)  = 0 by  assuming that the v shocks die out completely after 
twenty years. Table 5C.1 reports the results for Ball's quarterly data set, which 
includes GDP or GNP for Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The values in the 
table should be interpreted as the cumulative output loss experienced during a 
one-percentage-point decline in inflation. I study two cases, one in which in- 
flation and output are both difference stationary, and another in which I assume 
that T,  is I( 1) while y, is I(0). 
The estimates in table 5C.  1 can be compared to those in Ball's table 5.1. Of 
Table 5C.1  Estimates of the Impact of Nominal Shocks on Output and Inflation 
(cumulative five-year loss in gross domestic product per percentage- 
point decline in inflation) 
Cumulative Loss in 
Percent 
y,  is I(0)  y, is I( 1) 
Australia  0.08  -2.21 
59~3-9213  (1.99)  (4.92) 
Canada  1.60  5.69 
57:  1-92:3  (2.25)  (4.74) 
France  -0.76  -3.43 
70: 1-92:2  (1.31)  (5.50) 
Germany  -  1.42  8.90 
60:  1-92~2  (4.17)  (8.85) 
Italy  0.68  2.33 
60: 1-92: 1  (1.03)  (  1.27) 
Japan  -2.62  12.89 
57:  1-91: 1  (4.09)  (7.94) 
Switzerland  0.22  -2.23 
70: 1-92~3  (1.23)  (3.21) 
57:1-92:2  (1.21)  (1.56) 
United States  -0.52  8.36 
59:  1-92:4  (2.30)  (4.32) 
United Kingdom  -0.27  1.45 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The standard errors are computed from the outer product 
of the numerical derivative of  SV(7)  with respect to the parameters, including the covariance matrix 
of  v and u,  with the covariance matrix estimated by GMM on the exactly identified system. For all 
of  the calculations the vector moving average representation of the VAR  is truncated at eighty 
quarters, so I assume that aggregate demand shocks die out after twenty years. Data are quarterly, 
from the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics. All data are GDP,  except 
for Germany and Japan, for which they are GNP. 192  Laurence Ball 
the twenty-eight episodes Ball identifies, all fall well into two standard errors 
of the estimates calculated using my method, and a comparison of the magni- 
tudes suggests that Ball’s calculations are much closer to the ones which as- 
sume output is stationary. But the main point of the results is that the estimates 
are both very imprecise and dramatically different depending on the assump- 
tion about stationarity. For the United States, for example, the point estimate 
of the sacrifice ratio is 8.36 if output is I( I), but -0.52  if output is assumed to 
be I(0). (Keep in mind that as the horizon  T increases, the estimates of SJ73 
increase without bound when y, is I[ 11).  Furthermore, none of  the estimates 
differ from zero at standard levels of statistical significance. This leads me to 
conclude that we know very little about the actual size of the impact of policy 
shocks on output, and so attempts to explain fluctuations in these numbers are 
unlikely to yield any convincing evidence. 
I have one final comment that relates to the nature of the question being 
posed and how the answer is calculated. This is a more basic conceptual issue. 
As is clear from equation (4),  the calculation of the sacrifice ratio uses the sum 
of the undiscounted changes in output over some horizon. It seems strange to 
me to add these things up in this way.  Instead, I would suggest that we do 
something analogous to a cost-benefit analysis of inflation. 
From the time path of the output and inflation changes implied by the struc- 
tural vector autoregression (VAR), and an assumed discount rate, I can com- 
pute the present value of the  output loss associated with a one-percentage- 
point decline in inflation.  I can then ask what the benefit of this disinflation 
must  be for it  to be  worth incurring the cost. Since the  inflation decline  is 
permanent, we can calculate the necessary inflation benefit, as a percentage of 
GDP per year forever, that would be needed for us to be willing to pay the 
output costs. This estimated benefit can then be compared to estimates of  the 
costs of steady inflation. 
For the simple case implied by equation (l),  we can write this as follows. 
Assuming that the discount factor (measured at the same frequency as the data) 
is given by p, then the discounted value of the output loss-the  cost-is  just 
(5  ) 
This must be balanced against the inflation reduction. Calling 13 the “benefit” 
of reducing inflation by one percentage point (measured as a percentage of 
one-year’s GDP), we can write the benefit as 
PDV(y) = ~pl&,*. 
,=o  ,=o 
PDV(T) = R(~p‘&f22). 
,=o  ,yo 
Equating PDV(y) to PDV(IT),  I  can solve for l3.  If  one percentage  point  of 
steady inflation reduces output by more than 13  percent, then it is worth paying 
the cost to eliminate it. (This calculation has the advantage of getting rid of the 
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This is a simple calculation, and for the U.S. case, using an annual discount 
rate of 2 percent, I estimate that the output costs of disinflation equal the bene- 
fits of lower inflation when each percentage point of steady inflation has a cost, 
0, of 9.05 percent (standard error = 4.86) of a year’s GDP! In other words, if 
one percentage point of inflation costs 9.05 percent or more of  GDP per year 
forever, then it is worth paying the price to reduce it. The reason for this high 
point estimate is that with this specification the output costs and the inflation 
benefits both last forever. But again, the lack of precision of the estimate ren- 
ders it virtually useless. 
To conclude, my argument is that in order to even estimate the impact of 
monetary  shocks on output-Ball’s  sacrifice ratio-we  require a  structural 
model in which  such shocks are identified. An important element of  such a 
model is a set of assumptions about the time-series properties of output, infla- 
tion, and the shocks. After examining one specific model, my conclusion  is 
that the available data are unlikely to yield a convincing set of estimates. 
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